seclusion 33.sec.0003 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

Ron Sylvester of The Wichita Eagle and Frank Witsil of the Detroit Free Press reported today that 'A Michigan law enforcement official said Monday that federal agents went to the home of Dennis Rader's daughter to take a DNA sample shortly after his arrest Friday.'

Monday, Feb 28 1:20 p.m. update

Ron Sylvester reported in a February 28, 2005 AP article that investigators believed Dennis Rader was responsible for 13 murders, although the authorities vehemently deny this. The article further suggested that at least one of the additional murders is believed to have occurred after 1994, when the death penalty was re-instated in the state of Kansas. If police can prove that a previously unknown victim of BTK was murdered after 1994, prosecutors can make a good case for seeking the death penalty in this case, something for which many of the victim's families are hoping.

Associated Press reported Sunday that a source close to the investigation that police believed that BTK may have been responsible for the deaths of two Wichita State University students and a woman who lived down the street from another BTK victim. After Wichita Police Chief Norman Williams threatened legal action against anyone who spread erroneous information, AP modified its report to say that investigators are "looking into" whether BTK was responsible for another three killings.

Sedwick County D.A. Nola Foulston insisted that the information in the modified A.P report is false. However, if the three cases below are not being investigated by police, perhaps they should be. After all, the public has learned of three new BTK victims in the past year: Vicki Wegerle, Marine Hedge, and Dolores Davis.

Three cases have been posted on Internet bulletin boards which seem to fit the description of the victims in the Associated Press article.

* "Nov. 12, 1974: Sherry Baker, a Wichita State University student
stabbed in her apartment. Hands tied behind back (with a coiled telephone cord)
No sign of forced entry.
* June 29, 1985: Linda Shawn Casey, a Wichita State University student
found dead on the bedroom floor of her home bound, beaten, sexually assaulted, tabbed repeatedly. No sign of forced entry. At the time, BTK was mentioned as a possibility but discounted due to the length of time since his last known victim.
* Nov, 12, 1999: Tina Frederick, lived a few blocks from BTK victim Shirley Vian.
Found shot to death in her apartment - lying on a bedroom floor."

It has also been revealed that at the time Rader worked for the security company ADT between 1974 and 1989, he "held positions that allowed him access to customers' homes, including a role as an installation manager," the Associated Press reported on February 27th. A majority of the murders attributed to BTK have occurred during the period that Rader was employed by the company. Thus, it is possible that he used his position to seek out potential victims.

The Wichita Eagle wrote that "Rader worked at ADT Security Services. Nobody who worked with Rader during his 15 years with the company could stand him, according to several former co-workers."

Dennis Rader is a very polarizing figure: they either hated him or like him. As the Wichita Eagle reported, some people saw him as "arrogant, by-the-numbers, rude and confrontational. Others said he is efficient, nice, friendly and a regular guy."

Rader's bail has been set at a whopping $10 million, which will be set or changed during his next court hearing scheduled in the upcoming days. At that time, the 10 first-degree murder charges against him will be formally filed. Since there has been no indication, as of yet, that Rader has hired or asked for a lawyer, there is a chance that the court will have to appoint him one. Regardless, the lawyer will need time to review the case, which will likely prolong the hearing date, the Associated Press reported.

PICTURE2 Fox News reported that the suspect's daughter Kerri Rader, 26, provided the DNA samples that allegedly linked Rader to eight murders attributed to BTK between 1974 and 1986. The Wichita Eagle reported on Feb. 28 that Wichita Mayor Carlos Mayans confirmed that Kerri Rader's DNA was linked to the BTK victims.

Initially broadcast reports indicated that not only did Kerri Rader provide DNA samples to investigators, she had actually gone to the police to voice suspicions about her father being BTK. This allegation is denied by the Rader family and police. This ordeal has had a devastating effect on the Rader family, which is reportedly out of state in seclusion.

According to the Wichita Eagle, BTK's most recent communication was sent to the Fox News Wichita affiliate in mid February. Inside the package was a necklace, computer disk, and a copy of the cover of the 1989 John Sandford novel entitled "Rules of Prey." The story is about a serial killer called "the maddog."

county 2.cou.0002 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

All it did was let her know she could get away with medical abuse, and she moved on to the Kerrville clinic. Despite the risk of exposure in such a small place to inject children to the point of seizure, she didn't stop.

Although Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire was warned in veiled tones not to hire Genene Jones, she went ahead and did it, viewing Jones as a victim of the male-dominated patriarchy but a competent nurse. She had no idea that by teaming up with this woman, she was about to kill her own career, her marriage, and one of her young charges.

While awaiting trial, Jones told someone, "I always cry when babies die. You can almost explain away an adult death. When you look at an adult die, you can say they've had a full life. When a baby dies, they've been cheated."

Prosecutors presented Jones as having a hero complex: She needed to take the children to the edge of death and then bring them back so that she could be acclaimed their savior. One of her former colleagues reported that she wanted to get more sick children into the intensive care unit. "They're out there," she supposedly said. "All you have to do is find them."

Yet her actions may actually have been inspired by a more mundane motive: She liked the excitement and the attention it brought her. The children couldn't tell on her; they were at her mercy. So she was free to recreate emergencies over and over.

In a statistical report presented at the second trial, an investigator stated that children were 25% more likely to have a cardiac arrest when Jones was in charge, and 10% more likely to die. A psychiatric exam failed to give her the testimony she would need for an insanity defense.

Bexar County Court
Bexar County Court

On February 15, Jones was convicted of murder. Later that year, she was found guilty of injuring another child by injection. The two sentences totaled 159 years, but she's eligible for parole after twenty.

Although she was suspected in the deaths of other children, the staff at the Bexar County Medical Center Hospital shredded numerous records, thus destroying potential evidence. Most of those personnel who had protected her resigned, and the hospital settled a legal suit brought by the McClellans.

Despite that, Chelsea's mother will never forget something she witnessed shortly after her baby was buried. Going to the cemetery, she spotted Genene Jones kneeling at the foot of Chelsea's grave, sobbing and wailing the child's name. Confronted, Jones walked away without a word, but took with her a bow from Chelsea's grave.

As bizarre as it is to imagine a nurse putting babies at risk to the point of death, it may be easier to explain than the next strange story.

Frankford 5.fra.002002 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

Newton lists the Frankford Slasher case as unsolved in his books, although he's aware that Leonard Christopher was convicted of at least one murder. Still, he raises issues with the conviction and points out that there was no evidence tying Christopher to any of the other killings. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire (While he correctly says that the prosecutor offered no motive and no weapon, he does not include a full account of the evidence against Christopher. Pang's statements, at any rate, are compelling.) In Still at Large, Newton interviewed a Philadelphia investigator who said that Christopher is still a suspect in the other murders, but there are other suspects as well.

Still at Large, by Michael Newton
Still at Large, by Michael Newton
Antonia Mendoza does not include the Frankford Slasher in his own book about unsolved serial killings, although the victim count is certainly significant enough to do so. He buys the outdated and admittedly erroneous FBI statistic that there are between 35-50 serial killers at loose in the U.S.. While it is true that a number of murders that appear to have a predator in common are unsolved, it's generally not a good idea to just accept that they must be the work of a serial killer. The bungled Boston Strangler case is a good one to keep in mind. There are good suspects for many of those eleven murders and, technically, we could still consider at least some murders in that "series" unsolved. At any rate, the semen found on the last Boston Strangler victim, Mary Sullivan, did not match Albert DeSalvo, who was considered to be the Strangler. In addition, his description of her murder, as well as what he said about some of the other crimes, was full of errors overlooked by investigators in their rush to close a frightening case.


In short, while at least seven (or eight) of the Frankford Slasher murders remain unsolved as of this writing, and one did take place while Christopher was in jail, we cannot discount a copycat or the possibility that not all of the killings are related. Even in the event that they were all the work of a single killer and Christopher was not the attacker, there appears to have been no more of these particular crimes in that area since 1990. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire Yet significant questions remain regarding the quality of evidence used to convict Christopher and the fact that he did not match witness reports of a white man seen with other victims. In many respects, it seems clear that someone got away with murder.

Today, the Frankford area is poised for renovation and rebirth as an arts community. People want to forget its seedy past and get on with expansion and expression. In 2000, the Inquirer claimed that statistics showed Frankford as one of the safer places in the city. While the Frankford Slasher gave the area a sense of menace, citizens today believe that reputation is undeserved.

Mr. Terasaki 5.ter.003 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

[28]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report[130]

Ambassador Nomura reported that on the evening of August 28, 1941 he had exchanged opinions with Secretary Hull on the problems of the proposed conference. If either of the conferring leaders assumed an uncompromising attitude on certain points, the result would greatly endanger Japanese-American relations. For that reason, Secretary Hull desired that preliminary conversations be held for the purpose of effecting a general agreement prior to the major meeting.

While it was necessary to bring up-to-date both the Japanese and American policies, Secretary Hull maintained that the Chinese question would not necessarily stand in the way of an amicable understanding. On the other hand, the United States refused to adjust its relations with Japan at the expense of its friendship with China. Furthermore, even if America accepted a basis for a Japanese-Chinese peace, it would be faced with the tremendous problem of winning the approval of both Great Britain and Soviet Russia.

Ambassador Nomura refrained from clarifying further his government's statements regarding the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and the right of protection, but he was convinced that as long as Prince Konoye retained his position as Japanese Foreign Minister, every effort would be made to settle Far Eastern problems satisfactorily. Secretary Hull expressed the hope that Japan would take definite steps towards this end.

Ambassador Nomura reminded his government of the wide difference in viewpoint between the two governments which he had noticed during discussions on the proposals for an Understanding Pact. He feared that Tokyo's proposals would only add to the existing misunderstanding. In order that Japan might obtain further details regarding America's viewpoint, Ambassador Nomura asked that Colonel Iwakuro be consulted upon his return to Tokyo.

Ambassador Nomura then offered his government certain suggestions, in the event that Tokyo had agreed upon a meeting between the leaders of the two governments. Ambassador Nomura advised that his government consent to Juneau, Alaska as the conference site, if Constitutional requirements and reasons for personal safety made Hawaii unsatisfactory for President Roosevelt.

The conference date would be set about September 21, 1941 with five persons each from the Foreign Office; the Ministries of Navy and War, the Embassy and the Consulate in attendance.[131] Since it was assumed that Prince Konoye would make the trip by warship, about ten days would be required. Ambassador Nomura believed that the best time to make a public statement regarding the meeting would be shortly after the Prime Minister's departure from Tokyo.

Although Secretary Hull had agreed to discuss these points with President Roosevelt, he was extremely cautious in commenting on the proposed conference. Ambassador Nomura pointed out that Secretary Hull was an exceedingly cautious person, and warned that unless the two governments arrived at a fairly close agreement regarding the terms surrounding this meeting, the conference would never materialize.[132]

32. Secret Interpretation of Japan's Reply to President Roosevelt

On August 28, 1941 the Japanese government advised Ambassador Nomura concerning the interpretation of its recent reply to President Roosevelt.[133] After stressing certain instructions

[130] III, 91.
[131] Ibid.
[132] III, 92.
[133] III, 93.

[29]

regarding the style and form to be used in future messages pertaining to the question of Japanese-American relations, the Foreign Office advised Ambassador Nomura that the phrase "should a just peace be established in the Far East" meant that when the Chiang regime had become merely a local regime as a result of the closing of the routes to Chungking, when Japanese-Chinese relations had returned, on the whole, to normality, and when Japan efficiently and justly could secure the materials it needed from French Indo-China, Japan would consider withdrawing its troops from French Indo-China even before the complete settlement of the China Incident. The statement had been made originally because Japan had desired to allow as much flexibility as possible in the coming conversations.

With regard to the phrase "which will be applicable to the whole world, etc.," Japan wished to ensure that restrictions enforced against Japan within the East Asia area, where it hoped to establish the New Order Sphere of Co-prosperity, would be incumbent upon the United States outside the Pacific area.[134]

The Japanese government also pointed out to Ambassador Nomura that there were logical reasons for Japan's agreeing that all countries enjoying favorable conditions or having advantages over other countries should assume an attitude of strict impartiality in regard to the distribution of necessary materials. Japan felt that it would naturally assume this economic leadership within the East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity.

Since Japan's proposal had stated that it was natural and essential to make all adjustments in a spirit of equality and reciprocity with adjacent areas, Japan's position toward Manchukuo and China was thereby clarified, for such good neighborliness would ensure the establishment of the East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity. This policy was not, as the United States alleged it to be, aimed at securing a position superior to other nations in that area, since Japan was following closely the policy set forth in the American Monroe Doctrine. Furthermore, in order to satisfy "the requirements essential to the existence of a country" Japan would naturally take part in a joint defense of China.

Tokyo informed Ambassador Nomura that it had inserted these passages in its reply to President Roosevelt to guard against the possibility of its being too narrowly restricted in any discussions concerning the method by which the East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity was to be established.[135]

33. American Newspaperman Seeks Details of Prince Konoye's Message Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

In spite of the efforts of both Japanese and American officials to safeguard the secrecy of their conversations, certain publicity leaks occurred. On August 28, 1941, a reporter of the New York Herald Tribune called on Mr. Terasaki to inquire about the contents of the message from Prime Minister Konoye to President Roosevelt. Although Mr. Terasaki refused to refer to the contents of that message, it was alleged that in a recent interview with President Roosevelt it had been learned that Prime Minister Konoye wished to hold a conference with the American President in Hawaii.[136]

34. The Press Is Informed of Prince Konoye's Message To President Roosevelt

Ambassador Nomura advised Tokyo on August 28, 1941 that since the White House had announced the time for the interview with Ambassador Nomura, Secretary Hull had made public

[134] III, 94.
[135] III, 95.
[136] III, 96.

[30]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

the fact that a message from Prince Konoye had been delivered to President Roosevelt by Ambassador Nomura.[137] However, it was agreed by both the Japanese and American representatives that no reference would be made to the contents of this message.[138]

The Japanese press was notified on August 29, 1941 that Premier Konoye had sent a message to President Roosevelt but no details were given.[139]

35. Tokyo Demands Secrecy Concerning Proposed Conference

Since a disclosure in Japan of any information connected with the proposed conference between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye would endanger the successful conclusion of such a meeting, on August 29, 1941 Tokyo reiterated its warnings concerning the necessity of secrecy.[140] Ambassador Nomura was informed that on August 28, 1941 the Domei News Service had reported the reference to Prince Konoye's message which he had made in a press conference. Although Tokyo had been able to suppress these dispatches, a fairly large group of people had learned of their contents. In order to prevent similar occurrences in the future, the Japanese Foreign Office requested that Ambassador Nomura refrain from making any mention of Prince Konoye's message until he had first communicated with Tokyo.[141]

Tokyo pointed out that it had intended to keep the matter a strict secret for the time being, but since the news dispatch had been released in Washington, there was danger of further misunderstanding if it attempted to continue suppressing and censoring the news in Japan. Therefore, at 2:30 P.M. on August 29, 1941 certain sections of Prince Konoye's message were announced to the Japanese public.[142] Since the question of time was of the utmost importance, Tokyo requested that Ambassador Nomura explain to American authorities that it had not been able to wait to contact them.

Major reasons for the security measures taken by Japan were in relations with Germany and Italy, and its exceedingly complex domestic situation. Japan felt it quite possible that the United States had deliberately publicized this document in order to estrange Japan from the Axis countries. If information were allowed to leak out before a settlement was reached, there was actual danger that the project would fail. Though Ambassador Nomura's actions might be curtailed somewhat as a result, Japan insisted that he consult with the Foreign Office before making any public statements.

In regard to a suitable location for the "leaders' conference", Japan advised Ambassador Nomura that in case Hawaii were not selected, a place which was part of either nation should not be chosen, for President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye could meet at some spot on the high seas.[143]

In reply, Ambassador Nomura explained to Tokyo the difficulty of seeing President Roosevelt secretly since the American press was furnished with the list of callers at the White House. However, the Japanese Ambassador promised to consult with Secretary Hull to determine measures of avoiding undesirable publicity in the future.[144]

[137] The New York Times, August 29, 1941, 1:5 reported that Ambassador Nomura, at Prince Konoye's request, had begun conferences with President Roosevelt and in Secretary Hull's presence had delivered a note from the Japanese Prime Minister.
[138] III, 97.
[139] "The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State", S.D., II, 579.
[140] III, 98.
[141] Ibid.
[142] III, 99. See Section 39 for Ambassador Grew's report to the State Department which indicates that no details of Prince Konoye's message were released to the Japanese press. See III, 103.
[143] Ibid.
[144] III, 100.

[31]

36. Ambassador Nomura Asks Secretary Hull's Cooperation in Maintaining Secrecy (August 29, 1941)

In order to secure Secretary Hull's assistance in preventing further disclosures, on August 29, 1941 Ambassador Nomura submitted Tokyo's request that the Secretary of State cooperate in safeguarding the secrecy of future conversations.[145] A few days later Secretary Hull, recognizing that security was essential for the success of negotiations, agreed to cooperate with Japan in this matter.[146]

37. Newspaper Article Endangers Japan's Relations with Axis

Ambassador Nomura advised Tokyo on August 30, 1941 that an article appearing in the August 26, 1941 edition of the New York Herald Tribune had greatly disturbed the present situation.[147] Mr. Kasai, a member of the Japanese Parliament, stated that Foreign Minister Matsuoka had made a great blunder in signing the Tripartite Alliance, for although Mr. Matsuoka had believed it would contribute in the end to an improvement of Japanese-American relations, at present it was a stumbling block.[148]

Since such a newspaper article could only serve to aggravate present difficulties and was opposed to Japanese policy, Ambassador Nomura requested that Tokyo prevent other Japanese authorities from coming to the United States until conditions improved considerably.[149]

38. Ambassador Grew Confers with Mr. Terasaki (August 29, 1941)[150]

Since the Japanese press had learned via Washington of Prince Konoye's message to President Roosevelt, Japan requested that Ambassador Grew postpone his scheduled visit with Foreign Minister Toyoda to avoid further publicity. However, in order to convey to Ambassador Grew the text of Prince Konoye's message to President Roosevelt and to discuss the results of the newspaper leaks regarding it, Mr. Terasaki called on Ambassador Grew on August 29, 1941.

Although the newspaper reports had not disclosed the contents of the Japanese message, they nevertheless revealed to the pro-Axis elements in Japan that Prince Konoye had taken the initiative in an obviously conciliatory move. Indignation had been aroused previously by the order freezing Japanese assets in the United States, the shipment of oil to Russia, and America's decision to send a military mission, headed by General Magruder, to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

In view of this latest development, it was feared that serious obstacles would impair Prime Minister Konoye's attempts to reach an understanding with the United States, and there was a greatly increased possibility of an attempt being made on the life of Prince Konoye. To avoid this, Mr. Terasaki, speaking for the Japanese Foreign Minister, proposed that three steps be taken: first, that the meeting between the two government heads take place without delay to offset the rumors that the United States was applying pressure to Japan; that America postpone the routing of tankers to Russia; and lastly, that during the proposed conference, the American, order freezing Japanese assets be suspended. Emphasizing that the Japanese government had given the United States maximum assurances and commitments, particularly in regard to the Chinese situation and the Russian affair, Mr. Terasaki requested that America reciprocate by considering the Japanese proposals not from a legalistic, but rather from a psychological point of view.

[145] "The Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State", August 29, 1941, S.D., II, 579.
[146] "Secretary of State (Grew) to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura)", September 2, 1941, S.D., II, 586.
[147] III, 101.
[148] Ibid.
[149] III, 102.
[150] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", August 29, 1941, S.D., II, 579-582.

[32]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

In reply, Ambassador Grew pointed to the disparity between the very liberal administration of the freezing regulations in the United States and the harsh treatment meted out to Americans and their interests in Japan. Ambassador Grew then expressed to Mr. Terasaki Secretary Hull's views regarding the oil shipments and assured the Japanese official that the United States would consider no request concerning either the shipment of oil or the freezing of assets.

When Ambassador Grew criticized the tenor of American press reports which were being circulated through Japan, Mr. Terasaki replied that certain members of the Cabinet Information Board were pro-Axis in sentiment and the Japanese government was encountering difficulties in handling this question. Mr. Grew gave Mr. Terasaki no encouragement concerning the withdrawing of American tankers from the Russian route or suspending the order freezing Japanese assets.[151]

39. Ambassador Grew Indicates Responsibility of Ambassador Nomura for Publicity Leaks (August 30, 1941)[152]

In answer to Mr. Terasaki's expression of regret over the publicity in Washington concerning the delivery of Prince Konoye's letter to President Roosevelt, Ambassador Grew, on August 30, 1941, presented him with an excerpt from Secretary Hull's press conference held on August 28, 1941.

This revealed that when questioned by a correspondent regarding the nature of President Roosevelt's conversation with Ambassador Nomura, Secretary Hull declared that there had been a general interchange of views related to the affairs of the two countries. As to the nature of Prince Konoye's personal message, the delivery of which Ambassador Nomura had announced as he left the White House, Secretary Hull referred discussion on the matter to the Japanese Ambassador since he had not conferred with him about that point.

To queries regarding the possibility of a written or verbal agreement with Japan, and the theory that the message from the Japanese government had been in the form of a warning, Secretary Hull had merely declined to make any definite statements.

40. Japan Requests Simultaneous Release of Conference Publicity (September 1, 1941)

Aware of the growing dangers resulting from newspaper leaks, Tokyo urged on September 1, 1941 that absolute secrecy surround the Japanese reply to President Roosevelt's proposals. If the United States considered it necessary to publish a summary of this reply, Japan desired that it be notified first, in order that the disclosure might be made to both the Japanese and American peoples at the same time.[153]

41. Newspaper Leaks Continue to Concern Japanese Government

In spite of the efforts of the Japanese government to maintain the strictest secrecy regarding negotiations with the United States, newspaper leaks continued to add to the strain of the diplomatic situation.

Though a reporter had been denied any information when he had called on Mr. Terasaki to confirm the rumor of a proposed meeting between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye,[154] the New York Herald Tribune had printed a story to the effect that Prince Konoye had requested this interview with President Roosevelt. Consequently, on September 2, 1941 a reporter of

[151] Ibid.
[152] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", August 30, 1941, S.D., II, 582-583.
[153] III, 103.
[154] III, 104.

[33]

the New York Times inquired of Mr. Terasaki concerning the truth of this article, but Mr. Terasaki denied that he knew anything about it.[155]

Ambassador Nomura informed Tokyo on September 2, 1941 that he would again call such breaches of security to Secretary Hull's attention.[156]

42. Tokyo Summarizes the Japanese-American Situation for Its Ambassadors in Rome and Berlin

In a message to Berlin on August 30, 1941 Tokyo summarized the reasons for the new development in Japanese-American relations.[157] In accordance with the principles of Foreign Minister Matsuoka's Cabinet, Ambassador Nomura had carried on informal conversations with Secretary Hull in order to effect a solution to several problems. But when the Japanese army had occupied French Indo-China early in July, the United States froze Japanese assets. As a result, Japan and the United States were unable to carry on normal economic activities with one another, and the tenseness already existing between Japan and the United States became increasingly worse.

In order to alleviate the situation, Prime Minister Konoye had dispatched a message to President Roosevelt which was subsequently announced publicly by both countries. In view of its relations with the Axis countries, Japan had advised the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo of this development and, therefore, the Foreign Office asked that the Japanese Ambassadors in Berlin and in Rome take note of this situation.[158]

43. Ambassador Colonna Calls on Ambassador Nomura (August 30, 1941)

The Italian Ambassador resident in Washington, Don Ascanio dei principi Colonna, called on Ambassador Nomura on August 30, 1941 to discuss certain developments in Japanese-American relations.[159] Ambassador Nomura merely told him that the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo had been informed of President Konoye's message to President Roosevelt.[160] Relations between Japan and the United States were becoming extremely critical, and Ambassador Nomura quoted influential members of Congress as saying that there appeared to be an even chance for war. For that reason, the Japanese Prime Minister had issued a message to President Roosevelt in the hope of lessening the tension.

Since the Italian Ambassador was not content with these replies, Ambassador Nomura expressed the hope, with which Ambassador Colonna agreed, that the European War would soon end. Ambassador Nomura stated that Japan hoped the United States would not enter the war, but it would remain faithful to the Tripartite Pact regardless of America's stand in the European conflict. If war were to break out in the Pacific, it would be a long and drawn-out affair.[161] When reminded by Ambassador Nomura that America had remained extremely friendly toward Italy because of the several million citizens of Italian ancestry now living in the United States, the Italian Ambassador agreed with this view.

After concluding the report of his conference with the Italian Ambassador, Ambassador Nomura assured Tokyo that in accordance with instructions he had maintained strict secrecy. However, the Japanese Ambassador could not prevent the representatives of other countries from drawing their own conclusions as the result of Japan's actions. Though there was no way as yet of telling what the American reaction to the Japanese message would be, Ambassador Nomura had noticed signs of a Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire lessening of the tension between the two governments.[162]

[155] III, 104.
[156] III, Ibid.
[157] III, 105.
[158] Ibid.
[159] III, 106.
[160] III, 105.
[161] III, 106.
[162] III, 107

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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

44. Hull-Nomura Conversation (September 1, 1941)

(a) State Department's Report[163]

On September 1, 1941 Ambassador Nomura, accompanied by Mr. Shigeyoshi Obata, a Japanese educated in America, called on Secretary Hull to urge that an early reply be given Prince Konoye's message. After assuring the Japanese Ambassador that he would speak to President Roosevelt upon his return to Washington on the following day, Secretary Hull discussed briefly certain points that would naturally arise should a meeting between the heads of the two nations take place. In response to an inquiry from Secretary Hull, Ambassador Nomura said that he had reported to Tokyo concerning the remarks of Mr. Hull on August 28, 1941.

From Secretary Hull's reports regarding the Chinese situation, it would appear that China was far from a settlement with Japan. Though Ambassador Nomura replied that the discontinuance of American assistance would change China's attitude, Secretary Hull declared that if the good will of China was lost, this method would not result in a stabilized reconciliation.

Though stating that some obstacles to a solution of the fundamental differences might be met, Mr. Obata indicated that some agreement could undoubtedly be reached with regard to the retention of Japanese troops in North China and Inner Mongolia, the proposed Japanese economic cooperation with China, based on international non-discrimination, and the effect of Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact upon American self-defense. But Secretary Hull again insisted on the necessity for having an agreement in principle on fundamental questions before the meeting.

When Mr. Obata spoke of the need for simultaneous publication of any reports on such a meeting, Ambassador Nomura pointed out that although the Japanese government had criticized him for mentioning Prime Minister Konoye's personal message to President Roosevelt to the press, the newspapers in Tokyo had responded to the information favorably.

Secretary Hull noted that the attitude of the Japanese press had, to date, only succeeded in widening the breach between the two countries by its support of Japan's co-prosperity sphere in the Far East. Japanese attacks against the United States made it difficult to deal not only with American public opinion, but would repel China, Great Britain and the Dutch East Indies. Furthermore, since any agreement reached in a conference had to receive the backing of Japanese public opinion, Secretary Hull pointed to the present difficulties of the Japanese government in restraining its press from attacking the United States. In view of this, Secretary Hull suggested that Tokyo begin to exercise its influence with the press to emphasize the benefits of a peaceful program in the Pacific. Japan would have nothing to lose in this respect, even though no agreement were reached, since it would have to its credit an effort to achieve peace. Ambassador Nomura promised to submit this suggestion to his government.[164]

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

Ambassador Nomura reported on September 1, 1941 that immediately upon receiving instructions he had called on Secretary Hull to discuss the matter of maintaining secrecy in regard to all Japanese-American negotiations and to agree upon a simultaneous announcement of any information that was to be made public.[165] The Japanese Ambassador believed that apparently this problem was being handled by President Roosevelt himself.

President Roosevelt would have dinner with the Secretary of State upon his return to Washington from Hyde Park on September 4, 1941, and since both men were interested in the idea

[163] "Memorandum of a conversation", initialed by Joseph W. Ballantine, September 1, 1941, S.D., II, 583-585.
[164] Ibid.
[165] III, 108.

[35]

of a "leaders' conference", Ambassador Nomura believed that a reply to the Japanese proposals would be forthcoming shortly. Nevertheless, because of Secretary Hull's nature and position in the government, he was extremely cautious, for not only he, but many other Americans apparently were of the opinion that, regardless of Prince Konoye's intentions, the militaristic faction in the Japanese government and Japanese public opinion would not approve the adoption of a peaceful policy in the Pacific.[166] In order to offset such an impression, Ambassador Nomura explained that, as Prime Minister of Japan and a man of great political influence, Prince Konoye was determined to hold the conference.

According to Ambassador Nomura, Ambassador Grew in Tokyo was keeping Secretary Hull well informed on the opinions expressed in Japanese newspapers. Secretary Hull believed that the Japanese government should direct public opinion and influence outstanding political leaders and military men in such a way that they would approve the adoption of a peaceful program. Ambassador Nomura informed Tokyo that this idea would facilitate matters as far as negotiations with the United States were concerned, but pointed out that if such action were taken, it would lead to the suspicion that the United States was trying to interfere with Japan's internal politics.[167]

Secretary Hull then declared that China did not seem too anxious to make peace because it feared that sooner or later a militaristic Cabinet would be established in Japan. Ambassador Nomura replied that "China was America's spoiled child", asking for everything it wanted regardless of others.

To bring about friendly relations between Japan and China without offending China would be difficult said Secretary Hull, who stated that it was necessary to win the approval of Great Britain and other major countries concerned. In regard to the questions of self-defense and of non-discrimination, however, Secretary Hull felt that a satisfactory settlement could be reached.[168]

By way of explaining his government's intentions toward China, Ambassador Nomura assured Secretary Hull that Japan aimed to maintain peace in the Far East. This was evident from the commitments which it had repeatedly made. The stationing of Japanese and Manchukuoan troops in North China was not based on a permanent right of military occupation, and as soon as circumstances permitted, these forces would be withdrawn.[169]

Although Ambassador Nomura discussed with the Secretary of State the proposed "leaders' conference", no decision was made regarding the actual location. However, Ambassador Nomura advised Tokyo that since the climate was favorable even in the autumn, a meeting-place midway between Japan and the United States should be selected.[170]

Summarizing the present international situation, Ambassador Nomura declared that during this third year of the European War, the anti-Axis Powers had recovered from their former desperate defensive position and had built up their strength to equal the Axis Powers.[171] The United States was expanding its own defense and planning to supply the Allies with more materials. Furthermore, in spite of Germany's fighting power, the tremendous waste of manpower and materials on the Eastern Front would undoubtedly cause the war to carry over into next year.[172]

[166] Ibid.
[167] III, 109.
[168] III, 110.
[169] III, 111.
[170] III, 112.
[171] Ibid.
[172] III, 113.

[36]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

45. Roosevelt-Nomura Conversation (September 3, 1941)

(a) Secretary Hull's Report[173]

At President Roosevelt's request, Ambassador Nomura called at the White House on the afternoon of September 3, 1941 to receive an oral statement prepared in reply to the Japanese government's communication. Reading the document aloud, President Roosevelt stressed that since he realized the difficulties of the Japanese internal situation, he had hoped that, in turn, Prince Konoye would appreciate the difficult conditions existing in the United States.

The oral statement referred to the meeting between the respective heads of Japan and the United States, proposed by the Japanese Ambassador in an endeavor to save the situation in the Pacific. Assuring the Japanese Prime Minister that the American government was anxious to consummate the arrangements for such a meeting, President Roosevelt, nevertheless, suggested that preliminary discussions be held concerning problems to be settled at the meeting.

In order to further clarify the stand that the United States would take in the matters under discussion, President Roosevelt reviewed the events leading up to the present conditions.[174] At the outset of the informal and exploratory conversations entered into by Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura on April 16, 1941, the American government had set forth four principles as the fundamental basis for its future policy in dealing with all nations: Respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of nations; support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; equality in every field, including commercial opportunities; and maintenance of the "status quo" in the Pacific, except where it could be altered by peaceful means.

Not only did the United States believe that peace and stability in the Pacific could be reached only through adherence to these policies, but it was firmly convinced that Japan would profit more by adopting a similar course. The United States noted with satisfaction the statement from Ambassador Nomura to President Roosevelt, on August 28, 1941, which gave specific assurances of Japanese cooperation in the establishment of a peaceful program in the Pacific. America understood by this that any policy involving political expansion or acquisition of economic rights by force was excluded.

During the course of the informal conversations between Ambassador Nomura and Secretary Hull, another proposal, marked "Oral, Unofficial and Without Commitment", had been submitted by the American government as a redraft of the Japanese proposal of May 12, 1941. Certain divergencies of views had been noted in subsequent oral discussions which would have to be clarified at this time in order to facilitate a satisfactory settlement of the Pacific question.

President Roosevelt recognized that no government could reach a decision on policy without taking into account its own internal situation and the strength of public opinion. Japan would realize that the United States could not enter into an agreement that would not be in harmony with the principles of its people. President Roosevelt's statement was concluded with a request for a reply from the Japanese government on the matters set forth above.[175]

After finishing his oral statement, President Roosevelt discussed his recent conversations with Prime Minister Churchill during which both men had agreed that in dealing with certain post war governmental problems, a policy of settlement by plebiscites would be most effective.[176]

[173] "Memorandum by the Secretary of State (Hull)", September 3, 1941, S.D., II, 588-592.
[174] "Oral statement handed by President Roosevelt to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura)", September 3, 1941, S.D., II, 589-591. For Japanese version of this text sent by Ambassador Nomura to Tokyo, see III, 114.
[175] Ibid.
[176] S.D., II, 588.

[37]

President Roosevelt then read his letter to Prince Konoye. In replying to the Prime Minister's message of August 27, 1941, President Roosevelt expressed his satisfaction over Japanese solicitude for maintaining peace in the Pacific and improving relations with America. Cognizant of the rapidly developing character of world events, President Roosevelt desired to exchange views with the Japanese Prime Minister as soon as possible.[177]

In the statement accompanying Prince Konoye's letter, President Roosevelt had noted that the Japanese government believed the principles of the United States to be the prime requisites for a world peace. In view of the apparently favorable attitude of Japan, President Roosevelt wished to collaborate with it in the practical application of these principles.

Nevertheless, it was evident that certain opposing factions in Japan were strong enough to create obstacles to this proposed collaboration. Under such circumstances, President Roosevelt deemed it advisable that preliminary discussions concerning the basis for achieving and maintaining peace begin immediately, and requested Prince Konoye's assent to this proposal.[178]

When Ambassador Nomura asked his personal opinion regarding the proposed conference, President Roosevelt asserted that the idea was extremely favorable to him. Yet, he insisted that the success of such a conference would rest largely on the settlement of differences prior to the meeting. Once the United States was sufficiently assured that the Japanese principles were favorable to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific, the matter would, of necessity, have to be discussed with the British, Chinese and Dutch, because of their interests in the South Seas. Since difficulties had already been encountered with Tokyo because of its advancement by force into French Indo-China, both President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull emphasized the peaceful stand which Japan must adopt in order to gain the confidence of the nations concerned in the Pacific.

In spite of the opposition in Japan to Prince Konoye's proposal, Ambassador Nomura believed that a meeting between the two government leaders would enable the Japanese to overcome internal friction. Moreover, the questions relating to the complete evacuation of Japanese troops from China, non-discrimination along economic lines, and the interpretation of the Tripartite Pact could be removed as obstacles to Japanese-American friendship if the proposed conference took place.

As the discussion drew to a close, President Roosevelt reiterated his desire that the Japanese government clarify its position and its principles, and that it direct public opinion toward the support of a peaceful course.[179]

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

Ambassador Nomura reported that at President Roosevelt's request, he had come to the White House secretly at 5:00 P.M. on the afternoon of September 3, 1941.[180] At that time President Roosevelt read a personal message to be sent to Prime Minister Konoye and also the reply of the United States to the message of the Japanese government, dated August 28, 1941.[181]

After reading these messages, President Roosevelt stated that although Prince Konoye, Ambassador Nomura, Secretary Hull and himself were making every effort to maintain peace

[177] "President Roosevelt's reply to the Japanese Prime Minister (Prince Konoye), handed to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura)", September 3, 1941, S.D., II, 591-592. For Japanese version of this text sent by Ambassador Nomura to Tokyo, see III, 115.
[178] Ibid.
[179] S.D., II, 588-589.
[180] III, 116-117.
[181] III, 117.

[38]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

in the Pacific, public opinion in both Japan and the United States was an obstacle to friendly diplomatic relations. When President Roosevelt disclosed that he was very sympathetic toward Prince Konoye's position, Ambassador Nomura insisted that regardless of opposition, the Japanese Prime Minister was still determined to proceed with his plans, for of the three points mentioned in the American reply to the Japanese proposal, two points had been agreed upon in principle, and Prince Konoye expected to reach an agreement on the third at the conference.[182]

Pointing out that the British, Netherlands East Indies and Chinese governments would have to be consulted, Secretary Hull inquired concerning certain preliminary arrangements. President Roosevelt assured Ambassador Nomura that during his visit with Prime Minister Churchill he had made no reference to his conferences with Japanese officials. Since according to British custom, the Prime Minister must necessarily submit all matters to the Cabinet and finally to the Parliament, President Roosevelt had recognized that such disclosure would have made it difficult to maintain the secrecy desired by Japan.[183] Ambassador Nomura referred to a message he had received from his government which stated that after the existence of the Prime Minister's message to President Roosevelt had been made known to the public inadvertently, the militaristic faction had vehemently protested against the proposed conference since it feared its effects on the Tripartite Pact.[184]

According to Tokyo, the publication of the story in the Herald Tribune relating the rumor of a proposed conference between Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt had added to the internal confusion,[185] and though the Japanese government did not feel that such actions would destroy the results of a conference between the leaders of both governments, it desired that the matter be kept secret until all arrangements were completed.

Furthermore, the meeting should take place around the middle of September or at an earlier date, with a simple statement to that effect released without delay. The Japanese government advised Ambassador Nomura that if it did not receive an immediate reply concerning these proposals, it planned to issue a public statement describing its position in this matter to safeguard its domestic interests.[186]

However, a day later on September 4, 1941, Tokyo, fearful of causing a misunderstanding which would prevent the conference, requested that Ambassador Nomura rescind this clause.[187]

In regard to the date for the proposed meeting, President Roosevelt stated that the latter part of September would be inconvenient for him but that any other time would be suitable. Though Secretary Hull appeared to be gravely concerned over the general editorial trend of the Japanese press, President Roosevelt agreed to Japan's desire for the simultaneous publishing of any statements concerning these conferences. Ambassador Nomura determined to ascertain Secretary Hull's true attitude during a conversation scheduled for September 4, 1941.[188]

46. Mr. Terasaki Delivers a Message from Foreign Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Grew (September 3, 1941)

Meanwhile, in Tokyo, discussions covering the same general points and emphasizing once more the need for secrecy were taking place between American and Japanese officials. Calling

[182] III, 118.
[183] Ibid.
[184] III, 119.
[185] Ibid. The New York Times, September 3, 1941, 1:6 printed a story of the proposed conference which had to be discounted by the State Department. [186] III, 119.
[187] III, 120.
[188] III, 118.

[39]

by appointment on Ambassador Grew on September 3, 1941, Mr. Terasaki delivered a message from Foreign Minister Toyoda.[189] According to the Japanese Foreign Minister, the Japanese press had obtained information from American newspapers concerning the proposed meeting between the heads of the two governments in spite of all the efforts of Tokyo to prevent such a disclosure.

At this point, Ambassador Grew interposed that the published story had probably resulted from the clever deduction and news sense of the correspondents rather than from any official statement made by the American government. Insisting that the New York Herald Tribune was known to have been in possession of the actual facts, Mr. Terasaki stated that, irrespective of its source, the publicity attending the proposed meeting had increased the suspicion of certain factions in Tokyo that Japan was yielding to American pressure. To halt any mobilization of these pro-Axis elements, it was Mr. Terasaki's opinion that definite results would have to be accomplished by Prince Konoye's proposal.

With this end in mind, Foreign Minister Toyoda deemed it extremely important that an official announcement be released concerning the date and place of meeting between the two government heads. Furthermore, the Japanese government suggested that the conference take place about September 20, 1941 and that the anchorage determined upon be disclosed as "somewhere in the Pacific".

The Director of the American Bureau emphasized Foreign Minister Toyoda's concern over Ambassador Nomura's lack of discretion in speaking to the American press of Prince Konoye's letter to President Roosevelt. Mr. Terasaki assured Ambassador Grew that his government had no intention of delivering an ultimatum to America. Nevertheless, he made it clear that if the projected conference between Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt failed to materialize, Tokyo would be forced to inform the Japanese public, first, of the reasons motivating Prince Konoye's message to President Roosevelt, and second, of the spirit behind the proposed meeting.[190]

On the following day, September 4, 1941, Mr. Terasaki informed Ambassador Grew that both Prince Konoye and Foreign Minister Toyoda wished to retract that portion of the Foreign Minister's message which stated that, should the projected meeting between the two government leaders not be realized, Tokyo would be forced to publish the circumstances surrounding it. The Japanese government feared that such a statement might cause a misunderstanding detrimental to the proposed conference.[191]

47. Ambassador Nomura Advises Tokyo to Reply Briefly to the United States

To clarify the general trend of the informal conferences, Ambassador Nomura sent a message to Tokyo, on September 3, 1941, expressing the opinion that the United States desired mainly to ascertain Japan's definite attitude on questions relating to the rights of self-defense, equal trade opportunities and the terms for peace between Japan and China.[192]

Since he had repeatedly demonstrated his interest in these points during the unofficial conversations, Secretary Hull felt that he must be definitely advised of Japan's attitude in order to insure the success of the "leaders' meeting". According to Ambassador Nomura, the United States did not wish to receive a lengthy statement, which failed to express a definite proposal by the Japanese government.

Ambassador Nomura asked that Tokyo keep these factors in mind in drafting a reply to the American messages. Since Ambassador Nomura was scheduled to converse with Secretary Hull on September 4, 1941, he promised to send a more complete report at that time.[193]

[189] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 3, 1941, S.D., II, 586-687.
[190] Ibid.
[191] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 4, 1941, S.D., II, 592.
[192] III, 121.
[193] Ibid.

[40]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

48. Grew-Toyoda Conversation (September 4, 1941)

(a) Ambassador Grew's Report[194]

On the afternoon of September 4, 1941 Ambassador Grew called upon Admiral Toyoda and was assured that both Prince Konoye and the Japanese Foreign Minister would make every effort to bring about an early meeting between the Prime Minister and President Roosevelt, since Japan wished to ensure the ultimate success of its peace aims. If this conference were to fail, further efforts to establish friendly relations between the two countries would be useless. In order to achieve these objectives, Japan was prepared to take a definite stand on the matters under discussion, and to make certain provisional commitments. In return, it expected reciprocal commitments from the United States, which would be discussed at the proposed conference.

Stating that he had cabled the proposals to Ambassador Nomura in Washington, Foreign Minister Toyoda then handed Mr. Grew a written copy of the Japanese proposals[195] and requested him to cable them to Washington in his most secret code to obviate any possibility of inaccuracy through misunderstanding of the English language.

In its proposals the Japanese government expressed its willingness to concur in those matters which had already been tentatively agreed upon in the course of the informal conversations. Unless motivated by a justifiable reason, Japan promised that it would not make any military advancement from French Indo-China and the adjoining regions nor would it resort to military action against the territories lying to the north of Japan.

In the case of the United States' entrance into the European War, Japan was to decide independently upon an interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact. For the present, the attitude of both Japan and the United States toward the European war was to be determined by the necessary concepts of protection and self-defense.[196]

In regard to its relations with China, the Japanese government would endeavor to bring about general rehabilitation and re-establishment of normal activities. As soon as satisfactory agreements were concluded between Japan and China, the Japanese government was going to withdraw its armed forces.

In regard to the economic activities of the United States, Japan guaranteed that as long as it was pursued on an equitable basis, American trade would not be curtailed in China. Furthermore, Japan would cooperate in the production and procurement of necessary natural resources by the United States in the southwestern Pacific area where the principle of non-discrimination would govern Japan's international commerce. In connection with the resumption of normal trade relations between Japan and the United States, the Japanese government was willing, on the basis of reciprocity, to withdraw its control regulations from American commerce.[197]

In return for these concessions, Japan desired the United States to make similar guarantees. In view of Japan's proposed actions regarding China, the United States was to abstain from any measures which would be prejudicial to Japan's attempts to settle the China affair.

[194] "Memorandum by the Ambassador to Japan (Grew)", September 4, 1941, S.D., II, 593-595, 608-609.
[195] See S.D., II, 608 for text sent to Secretary Hull by Ambassador Grew on September 4, 1941.
[196] See III, 122 for same text sent in Japanese code to Ambassador Nomura on September 4, 1941 and delivered by him to Secretary Hull on September 6, 1941.
[197] S.D., II, 608-609. For Japanese message referring to this specific commitment see III, 123.

[41]

Japan's commitments with regard to trade in the southwest Pacific were naturally to be reciprocated by the United States. Furthermore, any military measures in either the Far East or southwest Pacific areas were to be similarly suspended by the United States, and since Japan wished to resume normal trade relations with the United States, it was desired that America cooperate by discontinuing the freezing of Japanese assets and by removing the prohibition against the passage of Japanese vessels through the Panama Canal.[198]

After stating that Tokyo was prepared to accept the tentative agreement which had been reached in the informal and preliminary conversations carried on at Washington, Foreign Minister Toyoda further declared that points (c), (d) and (e) in the newly submitted Japanese proposals would furnish the basis for an agreement on the chief points that had not been disposed of during previous meetings. Particular emphasis was laid on that section of the proposals which indicated an interpretation of the Tripartite Pact at variance with that of Mr. Matsuoka.

After examining the proposals handed to him, Ambassador Grew remarked that various points were susceptible to broad interpretation. In reply, Foreign Minister Toyoda suggested that they be discussed at the proposed meeting, and that reciprocal commitments and proposals between the two countries be embodied finally into a secret agreement formulated during that meeting. After the conference between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye had taken place, a general statement could be released to the press. To this suggestion, Ambassador Grew replied that the democratic system of the United States government made it impossible to conceal such meetings from the American public.

At the conclusion of the discussion, Admiral Toyoda revealed that he had not yet received Ambassador Nomura's report on his interview with President Roosevelt on the preceding day. Ambassador Grew also said that he had received no information concerning the conversation which had taken place.[199]

In the comment which Ambassador Grew appended to his report on his conversation with the Japanese Foreign Minister on September 4, 1941, he declared that it appeared to be impossible to work out a detailed agreement concerning each of the points in the Japanese provisional proposals during the short time allotted for the conference between Prime Minister Konoye and President Roosevelt.[200] In regard to any publicity following the meeting of the two government heads, Ambassador Grew believed it wise merely to announce that the government of Japan had subscribed to the principles of international relations enunciated by Secretary Hull, and that in accordance with these principles the reconstruction of problems affecting the Pacific area was under way.

In referring to the efforts of both governments in the establishment of a world peace, the statement should conclude by commenting that it was a source of gratification that both Japan and the United States had advanced toward their goal of peace without the sacrifice of legitimate expansion and aims.

Claiming that there was an obvious difference between Admiral Toyoda's proposals of September 4, 1941 and those transmitted on August 29, 1941, Ambassador Grew believed that the Japanese government was sincerely anxious to achieve a peaceful settlement with the United States.[201]

[198] S.D., II, 608-609. See III, 124.
[199] S.D., II, 593-594.
[200] "Comment by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 4, 1941, S.D., II, 594-595.
[201] Ibid.

[42]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

(b) Foreign Minister Toyoda's Report[202]

In a message to Ambassador Nomura on September 4, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda both summarized the conditions existing between Japan and the United States and interpreted the proposals which he had communicated to Ambassador Grew in an interview held on that day.

The Japanese government realized that the United States desired to hold preliminary conferences prior to the major meeting between the leaders of both countries in order to arrive at some agreement on the questions of self-defense, Japanese occupation of China, and equal treatment in trade. But with the disclosure of Prince Konoye's message to President Roosevelt, an internal situation had arisen in Japan which made it extremely urgent to hold the conference without further delay. If representatives of both governments continued to argue these questions merely from a legalistic viewpoint, it would be impossible to be ready for a meeting in the latter part of September.

The Japanese government had already expressed its views on the American proposals issued on July 24 and August 17, 1941, respectively, and could say nothing more on the subject. However, Japan would express its viewpoint in proposals which it was submitting both to Ambassador Grew and Ambassador Nomura for presentation to Secretary Hull. It was felt that the leaders of both countries could hold a conference for the discussion of the points already agreed upon in preliminary discussions, and could then issue a joint statement at the conclusion of their interview. This would create a more wholesome atmosphere between Japan and the United States. The Japanese government promised to send Ambassador Nomura a suggested text of this joint agreement as soon as it could be made ready.[203]

The Japanese Foreign Minister had conversed with Ambassador Grew in the afternoon of September 4, 1941 and had submitted the Japanese proposals concerning which certain points required a special explanation. The two conferees would decide whether the conclusions reached during the conference would be in the form of a secret or ordinary agreement. Japan was confident that its concessions, particularly those made with regard to the interpretation of the Tripartite Pact, would meet the approval of the United States.

Referring to the withdrawal of both governments' freezing orders, Japan warned Ambassador Nomura against admitting that the United States' freezing measure had proved damaging to Japan, and directed him to explain that the United States' action in this regard had given the Japanese people the impression that their country was being punished for the occupation of French Indo-China. Therefore, if the order were rescinded by any technical, complicated and halfway measure, it would not be understood by the people at large.

In spite of possible strong opposition within America, the Japanese government believed that the United States should reciprocate the concessions made by Tokyo by withdrawing the freezing order as soon as an agreement was reached by the conferees.

When Japan requested that the United States cease military measures in the Far East, it had in mind the dispatching of submarines and airplanes to the Philippines and the recent acquiring of American military bases in the southwestern Pacific, China and Far Eastern Russia.[204]

[202] III, 125.
[203] Ibid.
[204] III, 126.

[43]

49. Hull-Nomura Conversation (September 4, 1941)

(a) State Department's Report[205]

Accompanied by Mr. Obata, Ambassador Nomura called at Secretary Hull's apartment on September 4, 1941 to express his pleasure over President Roosevelt's reply to Prince Konoye's message. In reply to the request in President Roosevelt's oral statement for a definition of the Japanese government's attitude regarding the three fundamental divergencies of view that had remained unreconciled when the conversations ended in July, Ambassador Nomura stated that those points had been disposed of, in spirit at least, in the Japanese statement of August 28, 1941. In the opinion of the Japanese Ambassador there no longer existed any basic differences between Japan and the United States concerning the principles of peace.

In emphasizing the necessity of consulting with the Chinese, British, and Dutch before entering into final negotiations, Secretary Hull declared that the support of these nations must be enlisted in order to maintain a broad program of peace in the Pacific area. In order to allay any apprehension, particularly on the part of the Chinese, the American and Japanese governments would have to reach a clear understanding beforehand regarding points that would affect China.

Referring to Japanese obligations under the Tripartite Pact, Ambassador Nomura declared that since this alliance was purely defensive there was no question of Japan's attacking the United States should America enter the war. Nevertheless, Secretary Hull insisted that if the United States made an agreement with Japan without first obtaining explicit assurance concerning the interpretation of the Tripartite Pact, difficulties would arise with the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

In answering Ambassador Nomura's queries regarding discussions prior to the conference between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye, Secretary Hull raised the question of broadening the proposed trade commitments. In the light of the exigent economic problems which would arise after a peace settlement had been reached, Secretary Hull believed that the existing trade proposals were contrary to Japan's own interest.

After this remark Ambassador Nomura stated that he was awaiting his government's instructions concerning a statement of its present attitude toward the three fundamental points at issue. Ambassador Nomura then handed Secretary Hull a new draft of the Japanese proposals, which he said was a redraft of the American proposals of June 21, 1941. The document was marked "Unofficial, Exploratory, and Without Commitment".[206]

As the meeting drew to a close, Ambassador Nomura referred to the release of a public announcement concerning the meeting of Japanese and American governmental heads. Secretary Hull did not object to an announcement that formal exploratory conversations were in progress, but stated that any publicity regarding the negotiations should be deferred until preliminary discussions had been completed and the other governments concerned in the matter had been approached.[207]

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report[208]

In order to determine Secretary Hull's views on the preliminary talk which Mr. Hull had with President Roosevelt, Ambassador Nomura called on the Secretary of State on the morning of September 4, 1941.

[205] "Memorandum of a conversation", September 4, 1941, S.D., II, 595-596.
[206] This document was submitted without the approval of the Japanese government and was subsequently withdrawn by the Japanese Ambassador. For complete text see S.D., II, 597-600.
[207] S.D., II, 595-596.
[208] III, 127-129.

[44]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Secretary Hull again brought up the four basic principles which had been discussed in the previous meeting: guaranteeing the territorial integrity of all countries; non-intervention in domestic issues; equal commercial opportunity for all nations; and the maintenance of the status quo in the Pacific. Ambassador Nomura pointed out that the Japanese government's reply to the American note had made it clear that Japan was in full agreement with these principles.[209] However, Japan wished to settle the problems upon which no agreement had been reached in the past informal negotiations. Secretary Hull replied that it was necessary to dispose of the aforementioned four basic principles. Since the United States had no intention of giving the impression that by negotiating with Japan it intended to trade off China, Great Britain and other interested powers, it would be necessary to get the approval of these third powers.[210]

In discussing the American proposal, Ambassador Nomura was of the opinion that the reference to the attitude of Soviet Russia and Great Britain toward the European war should be omitted, but Secretary Hull objected to this suggestion. Moreover, he desired that Japan completely withdraw its troops from North China instead of stationing them there for the alleged purpose of opposing Communism.

From his conversation with Secretary Hull, Ambassador Nomura received the impression that the American attitude toward Japan was stiffening.[211]

50. Ambassador Grew Confers with Foreign Minister Toyoda (September 5, 1941 )[212]

Although Prince Konoye had invited Ambassador Grew to confer secretly with him at a private home on the evening of September 5, 1941, circumstances forced the postponement of the meeting until the following day. In Ambassador Grew's opinion the Japanese Prime Minister had desired to discuss President Roosevelt's reply to his message, as well as President Roosevelt's oral statement, but had deemed it advisable that Foreign Minister Toyoda discuss the matter first. Consequently, Ambassador Grew called on the Japanese Foreign Minister late in the afternoon of September 5, 1941 and Foreign Minister Toyoda questioned him regarding both those matters.

Since a complete report had not reached Ambassador Grew from the American Department of State, Foreign Minister Toyoda showed Ambassador Grew an English text of both the President's message to Prince Konoye and the oral statement. Furthermore, he requested Ambassador Grew's impression concerning the fundamental differences of view which had not been brought into conformity before the conversations in Washington had been interrupted. However, since Ambassador Grew felt that his own telegram reporting his conversation on the preceding day with the Foreign Minister had not yet been received in Washington and, therefore, the United States government was unaware of Foreign Minister Toyoda's belief that the Japanese proposal, dated August 28, 1941 contained the solution to these differences, he could not discuss the problems further with the Japanese Foreign Minister until he had been informed of his government's reaction to the proposal. At Foreign Minister Toyoda's request, Ambassador Grew promised to convey to Secretary Hull his desire for an early report on the American government's reaction to Foreign Minister Toyoda's proposal.[213]

In commenting on the interview scheduled to be held with Foreign Minister Toyoda on the next day, September 6, 1941, Ambassador Grew in his notes of September 5, 1941 stated that

[209] III, 127.
[210] III, 128.
[211] III, 129.
[212] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 5, 1941 S.D., II, 600-603.
[213] Ibid.

[45]

he would avoid discussing any of the questions at issue pending a report from the State Department at Washington.

Foreign Minister Toyoda had expressed the opinion that any necessary conversations called prior to the meeting of Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt should be held at Tokyo in view of the language difficulties that had apparently arisen in Washington. However, Ambassador Grew made it clear that he could make no such recommendation since decisions of this sort were made by the American government.

Having examined carefully the reports of the oral discussions concerning the American redraft of the original Japanese proposals, it seemed apparent to Ambassador Grew that there existed four substantial points upon which no agreement had been reached: (1) the questions of equal opportunity and nondiscrimination in China, (2) the maintenance of Japanese garrisons in China, (3) the respective attitudes of the United States and Japan toward the war in Europe and (4) the question of military bases. At present it was necessary to determine to what degree the new Japanese proposals answered these four points, and to discover whether they afforded an adequate basis for the proposed meeting between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Konoye.

According to Ambassador Grew, no oral or written Japanese promises could completely guarantee the carrying out of their proposals. In order to return to the "status quo ante" in the Far East, and to reestablish satisfactory relations between the countries concerned in the Pacific, Japan would undoubtedly have to cease its progressive acts of aggression. Nevertheless, Ambassador Grew believed that, if implemented, the new Japanese proposals might provide the basis for the establishment of peace.

With this end in view, Ambassador Grew also felt it desirable that American military and economic measures against Japan be relaxed as Japan moved towards implementation of its commitments. Thus, Japan would be provided with inducements to honor its proposals, and the United States would have a lever of compulsion. Ambassador Grew believed that the risk involved in this procedure appeared to be less serious than the risk of armed conflict entailed in the progressive application of economic pressure.[214]

51. Japan Requests Ambassador Nomura to Expedite the Conference Arrangements

On September 5, 1941 Tokyo informed Ambassador Nomura that since it had not yet received the messages from Ambassador Nomura which had been delivered to him by President Roosevelt on September 3, 1941, the Japanese government was unaware of the American attitude toward the suggested meeting of the respective leaders. Nevertheless, in order to facilitate the conclusion of an understanding, the Foreign Minister had given Ambassador Grew a document containing further concessions by Japan toward the adjustment of diplomatic relations. The contents of this document were in essence the Japanese reply to the request of the United States for a preliminary understanding. In order to eliminate the possibility of any misunderstanding the proposals had been worded simply.

Since these latest proposals were the maximum concessions which Japan could make in meeting American demands, Ambassador Nomura was requested to impress the American government with the importance of the proposals as preliminary expressions of Japanese intentions to achieve a complete settlement of all questions through politics and diplomacy. Though Japan was ready to give a clear and concise reply to any questions raised by the United States, it felt that further discussions would serve only to delay the conference between Japanese and American leaders. For this reason, both Ambassador Grew and Ambassador Nomura were requested to exercise their influence in discouraging such questions.[215]

[214] "Comment by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 5, 1941, S.D., II, 601-603.
[215] III, 130.

[46]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

52. Ambassador Grew Confers with Officials in Tokyo (September 6, 1941)

(a) Conversation with Foreign Minister Toyoda

During a conversation with Foreign Minister Toyoda on the morning of September 6, 1941 Ambassador Grew, carrying out instructions received in a State Department telegram, informed the Japanese Foreign Minister that the American government could not suspend the sailing of American tankers to Vladivostok, nor could it withdraw the freezing order pending the proposed meeting of the representative heads of Japan and the United States.[216]

Later on the same day, while conferring with the Director of the American Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Office, Ambassador Grew heard Mr. Terasaki's opinions on the influence of the Axis in Japan. In spite of the publicity leaks which had occurred in regard to Prince Konoye's proposal to President Roosevelt, and the reports circulating at present about the projected meeting between the two government heads, Japan was attempting to keep its negotiations with the United States secret. Nevertheless, through subordinate officials in the Foreign Office and the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Germany and Italy were endeavoring to secure information concerning the progress of Japanese-American relations.

Though Foreign Minister Toyoda, unlike Mr. Matsuoka, permitted Mr. Terasaki to exercise a certain control over the instructions sent to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, there were still large numbers of influential Germans in strategic governmental organizations and positions in Tokyo. On the basis of confidential reports, Mr. Terasaki had also learned that Japanese pro-Axis elements were plotting a coup on September 27, 1941, the anniversary of Japan's adherence to the Axis.

Confronting those opposed to a Japanese-American understanding with a fait accompli would be an efficacious way of forestalling their plans, said Mr. Terasaki. Moreover, the news that concrete agreements had been reached between the two countries would be welcomed by the Japanese public.[217]

(b) Conversation with Prince Konoye

In the evening of September 6, 1941 Ambassador Grew dined at a private home with Prince Konoye, Mr. Ushiba, the Prime Minister's private secretary, and Mr. Eugene Dooman, Councilor at the American Embassy.[218] In a three hours' conversation concerning the fundamental principles advanced by both Japan and the United States, the views of the Japanese government were discussed.

Prince Konoye agreed whole-heartedly that the four principles enumerated by Secretary Hull were a sound basis for the rehabilitation of relations between the United States and Japan. Assuming culpability for the present discord existent between the two countries, the Japanese Prime Minister recognized that it was his responsibility to bring about peace in the Pacific. Since failure now would prevent future Prime Ministers from effecting a peaceful collaboration between Japan and the United States, Prince Konoye was determined to conclude his endeavors successfully in spite of opposing factions.

As a result of the latest Japanese commitments, Prime Minister Konoye hoped that a common basis had been established for a meeting between President Roosevelt and himself. While cognizant that many points needed clarification and more precise formulation, Prince Konoye remained confident that since his proposals were backed by Japanese naval and military leaders, any divergencies in view could be easily reconciled.

From the reports of Ambassador Nomura in Washington, the Japanese Prime Minister had concluded that the American government doubted the strength of the present Japanese Cabi-

[216] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 6, 1941, S.D., II, 603-604.
[217] Ibid.
[218] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 6, 1941, S.D., II, 604-606.

[47]

net to resist the anti-American factions. Admitting that certain elements within the armed forces did not approve of his policies, Prince Konoye nevertheless was certain that he was fully supported by the responsible chiefs of both the Japanese army and navy. When the proposed conference between the two government heads took place, a full Admiral, possibly Admiral Yoshida, a full General and the Vice-Chiefs of Staff were expected to accompany the Japanese Prime Minister.

At the same time, however, Prince Konoye believed that resentment in Japan over the economic pressure exerted by other countries was mounting, and that unless a settlement between the United States and Japan was effected within the year, the Japanese extremists would be in a position to profit by the situation. When Ambassador Grew had pointed to the failure of the Japanese government to carry out promises made by former Japanese Ministers, Prince Konoye answered that his government wished to bring about a thorough reconstruction of American-Japanese relations. Furthermore, any commitments made by Japan at this time would be strictly observed.

If President Roosevelt desired to communicate secretly with Prince Konoye, the Japanese Prime Minister promised to arrange subsequent confidential meetings with Ambassador Grew. In view of the present internal situation in Japan, however, Prince Konoye hoped that the projected meeting with President Roosevelt would be arranged with the least possible delay since he felt that all problems could be solved to their mutual satisfaction. He was determined to achieve the proposed reconstruction of relations with the United States regardless of cost or personal risk.[219]

53. Hull-Nomura Conversation (September 6, 1941)

(a) State Department's Report[220]

Calling at his own request, Ambassador Nomura with Mr. Obata visited Secretary Hull in his apartment on September 6, 1941. After handing Secretary Hull a document containing Japanese proposals for the adjustment of diplomatic relations, the Japanese Ambassador declared that the statement had been prepared before September 3, 1941, the date of President Roosevelt's reply to Prince Konoye's message.[221] Nevertheless, Tokyo believed that the contents of this communication contained not only the spirit of its previous statement transmitted to President Roosevelt on August 28, 1941, but also a reply to President Roosevelt's message of September 3, 1941.

On the evening of August 28, 1941 Secretary Hull had spoken of the desirability of reaching an agreement on certain fundamental questions before the meeting of the two government heads took place. Ambassador Nomura had referred these views to the Japanese government and they had now been acted upon. In the light of existing circumstances, Ambassador Nomura believed that Japan was now making its maximum concessions. Secretary Hull then assured Ambassador Nomura that he was anxious to proceed as quickly as possible. To Ambassador Nomura's suggestion that the announcement of preliminary discussions be hastened, Secretary Hull replied that he saw no objection to having it known that informal and exploratory conversations were underway.[222]

[219] Ibid.
[220] "Memorandum of a conversation", initialed by Joseph W. Ballantine, September 6, 1941, S.D., II, 606-607.
[221] For the text of the Japanese government's proposals handed to Ambassador Grew on September 4, 1941, see III, 122-124. For the text handed to Secretary Hull on September 6, 1941, see "Draft proposal handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State", September 6, 1941, S.D., II, 608-609.
[222] "Memorandum of a conversation", initialed by Joseph W. Ballantine, September 6, 1941, S.D., II, 606-607.

[48]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report[223]

In accordance with the instructions he had received from Tokyo, Ambassador Nomura secretly called on Secretary Hull the morning of September 6, 1941 and handed him a document containing Japanese proposals for the adjustment of American relations. Ambassador Nomura explained that this document was a copy of that handed to Ambassador Grew by Foreign Minister Toyoda.

Although the document had been prepared before the Japanese government received on September 3, 1941 President Roosevelt's reply to the message from Prince Konoye, dated August 28, 1941, it was composed with the purpose of clarifying certain points to remove obstacles to the proposed conference. It expressed the attitude of the Japanese government toward President Roosevelt's personal message and his oral statement.[224]

Moreover, the opinions which the Japanese government had set forth in its August 6, 1941 communication, as well as other messages and papers from Prime Minister Konoye, and the latest Japanese concessions were thought by Japan to meet the desires of the United States. By going to the maximum limits in its concessions to the United States, Japan hoped that it would influence the United States to display a high degree of statesmanship by agreeing without further delay to a conference between the leaders of both governments.[225]

Secretary Hull replied that his hasty perusal of Ambassador Grew's report would prevent him from discussing its contents at this time, but he promised to study it carefully during the coming weekend.[226] It was apparent from Secretary Hull's remarks that he doubted the stability of the Japanese Cabinet.[227] Moreover, since an increasing number of people in the United States were favoring the adjustment of Japanese-American relations, Mr. Hull believed that the Japanese government could influence Japanese public opinion in this same direction.

Ambassador Nomura emphasized the necessity of maintaining peace in the Pacific, but though Secretary Hull agreed, he maintained a very cautious attitude.[228] In order not to give a mistaken impression to other countries, Secretary Hull desired that information released on the negotiations should reveal merely that both Japan and the United States were studying the basis upon which the Pacific question could be solved.[229]

In view of this, Ambassador Nomura believed that there was no reason to rescind the Japanese statement in regard to the necessity of explaining Tokyo's position to the Japanese people.[230]

54. Japanese Embassy Is Warned Concerning Newspaper Leaks (September 6, 1941)

Newspaper leaks continued to be a main source of concern to the Japanese authorities. Mr. Morishima was particularly disturbed over a recent interview with Mr. Kasai which had appeared in the New York Daily News. Although Mr. Kasai apparently had given the interview in accordance with a directive from Japan, Mr. Morishima believed that his reference to the

[223] III, 131-134.
[224] III, 131. [225] III, 132. [226] III, 133.
[227] Rumors of a Cabinet crisis in Japan had already appeared in The New York Times, August 28, 1941, 3:1 and August 29, 1941, 1:8. Finally an emergency session of the Cabinet was called to hear Prince Konoye explain the developments of the talks and his message to President Roosevelt.
[228] III, 133.
[229] III, 134.
[230] III, 120, 134.

[49]

current Japanese-American negotiations not only served to aggravate the existing situation and raise another obstacle to the achievement of amicable diplomatic relations, but was particularly inappropriate because of the existence of the Tripartite Pact.[231]

Mr. Morishima reminded the Japanese Ambassador of a previous article by Mr. Kasai which had appeared in the New York Herald Tribune,[232] and requested him to caution Mr. Kasai against further statements.[233]

55. Japanese Intelligence Discloses America's Desire for Peace in the Pacific

On September 6, 1941 a report from Mr. Morishima of the Japanese office in New York revealed information obtained by a private Japanese spy to the effect that both President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill had agreed that it would be necessary to settle the Japanese question harmoniously, for if an advantageous understanding were reached, the American Pacific Fleet could then be transferred to Atlantic waters.[234] In keeping with this idea, according to the source, the United States had instructed Ambassador Grew in Tokyo to rally the pro-Allied elements in Japan and to foster a tendency toward compromise with the United States among the anti-Axis groups.

On the other hand, Great Britain and the United States had been instructing their officials to strengthen their attitude toward Japan in an endeavor to force Japan to its knees. Washington believed that if it became more demanding as Japan became more conciliatory, an understanding could be reached even on the Siberian question. Apparently American authorities accepted the attitude of Prince Konoye and the recently mollified attitude of the Japanese government toward the sailing of American tankers to Russia as an indication of the success of this policy.[235]

Nevertheless, American officials continued to fear that Japan's internal situation might ultimately prevent the United States from arriving at a peace with Japan. In order not to jeopardize the political prestige of Prince Konoye's Cabinet, President Roosevelt was guarding against taking too stringent steps or making immodest demands.

In regard to the sailing of American tankers to Russia, the United States was even considering its guaranteeing that the materials sent there would not be left in Siberia or that in the future they would be shipped via the southern tip of Kamchatka or the detour around Persia.[236]

56. Minister Wakasugi Prepares Return Trip to United States

Since August 31, 1941 when Minister Wakasugi had arrived in Tokyo for the Cabinet change,[237] the Japanese government had been receiving firsthand information on the Japanese-American informal conversations in Washington. However, on September 6, 1941 Tokyo informed Washington that Minister Wakasugi was returning to the United States[238] and, therefore, the Japanese Embassy was asked to contact American authorities in order to obtain reservations aboard the next China Clipper.

[231] III, 135.
[232] III, 101.
[233] III, 135.
[234] III, 136.
[235] III, 137.
[236] III, 138.
[237] New York Times, August 31, 1941, 1:4, 8.
[238] According to the translation of these dispatches Minister Wakasugi was apparently returning to Japan. However, collateral information obtained from later decoded Japanese messages proved that Minister Wakasugi, in Tokyo since August 31, 1941, was now returning to Washington.

[50]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

If it were impossible to secure this reservation, Minister Wakasugi would sail aboard the Terukawa Maru of the Kawasaki line on September 12, 1941. If a last minute reservation were obtained on the plane the Japanese government still intended to use the stateroom aboard the Terukawa Maru.[239] On the same day Tokyo asked Canton for any information on ships leaving for Hongkong on or about September 15, 1941.[240]

Since the Terukawa Maru would be one or two days late in leaving, Tokyo asked Washington to reply about the request for Clipper reservations before noon of September 12, 1941, Japanese time.[241] But in spite of the fact that Ambassador Nomura himself had promptly requested the State Department's assistance in making reservations, there were no vacant seats aboard the Clipper for several weeks to come.[242]

Although these preparations were unavoidably delayed, the return of Minister Wakasugi to the United States was considered to be a sign of Japanese hope for Pacific peace.[243]

57. Grew-Terasaki Conversation (September 8, 1941)

(a) Ambassador Grew's Report[244]

Because the recent incident involving the American destroyer Greer and a German submarine had become of major concern to the Japanese government, Mr. Terasaki called upon Ambassador Grew to deliver a message from Foreign Minister Toyoda who feared that this incident might involve Japan in an interpretation of the Tripartite Pact, since Germany was asserting that the American ship had committed an unprovoked act of aggression. The Japanese Foreign Minister indicated that this was a further proof of the necessity of expediting the suggested meeting between the leaders of the two nations.

Ambassador Grew declared that he had already sent the Foreign Minister the official statements made by President Roosevelt and the Navy Department regarding the Greer incident. Mr. Terasaki then submitted Foreign Minister Toyoda's request that officials of the United States government guard the secrecy of their conversations with the Japanese, since unwarranted publicity at this critical moment would make it difficult to control the dissident groups in Japan.[245]

(b) Japanese Foreign Office Report[246]

Although the incident under discussion concerned an attack by a German submarine upon the destroyer, the U.S.S. Greer, en route to Iceland with mail, Japanese diplomats recognized that their alliance with Germany might jeopardize Japanese-American negotiations. When President Roosevelt announced his intention to broadcast America's official attitude toward the Greer incident on September 11, 1941, Japanese officials feared that his speech might connect the Japanese government with the incident. In order to guard against the extremely undesirable results which would ensue, Mr. Terasaki, in charge of American affairs in the Foreign Office at Japan, discussed the problem with Ambassador Grew. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

To re-emphasize the importance of the situation, Tokyo requested on September 8, 1941 that Ambassador Nomura have an informal conversation along the same lines with Secretary

[239] III, 139.
[240] III, 140.
[241] III, 141.
[242] III, 142.
[243] New York Times, September 15, 1941, 7:2, 4.
[244] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 8, 1941, S.D., II, 609.
[245] Ibid.
[246] III, 143.

pals 3.pal.002002 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

Synopsis

Kenny spontaneously combusts. The mayor asks Randy Marsh to find a solution. The boys try to help Kyle's dad to get an erection. One way they think they can help is by performing the Stations of the Cross at church crucifying Cartman and waiting three days for his res-erection. Randy Marsh figures out the reason everyone is combusting is because they are withholding their farts.
Full Recap

Kyle is looking for an erection (the boys don't know what it is) because his parents are always fighting because his dad can't get one. They are kicked out of the store, the fifth one that has done so. Outside, Kenny tells his friends that he is taking a bus to see his girlfriend (probably Kelly) but then he explodes. The townspeople see this and get scared, realizing that Kenny spontaneously combusted. The mayor gets Randy Marsh to do the job because he is the only scientist in town (he's a geologist). After a very short funeral for Kenny, Father Maxi asks the boys if they could do the Stations of the Cross. Maxi says it is about the resurrection of Jesus. Kyle thinks "resurrection" is what his dad needs and helps too (he is not too Jewish to worship Jesus). Meanwhile, other people start to combust.
Randy starts thinking how these people combust and Stan tells him that Kenny was talking about his girlfriend. Meanwhile, Stan gets a Bible and now need someone to be Jesus. Cartman says that he is Jesus or he's leaving, so Kyle and Stan reluctant let him play the role. Elsewhere, another person combusted, and the person who died was going to see her boyfriend. At the church, they put on the ceremony. They put Cartman on the cross and leave him on a hill for three days, like what it said the Bible. Eventually, Randy arrives at a solution: people don't want to pass gas in front of there boyfriend/girlfriend so they hold it in. They held it in too long and combusted. Everyone starts farting all the time.
At the Nobel Prize Awards, Mephisto wants to get Randy back for "taking" his award. The heat keeps on rising in the town and the mayor needs Randy to help again. While appearing on Jesus and Pals, Mephisto states that because people keep farting, it has ripped a hole in the ozone layer; as a result, he convinces the entire town to hate Randy. Stan, Kyle, and Randy try to find a way to stop all the bad stuff from happening. Despite all the goings-on, Cartman is still mounted on the hill and is now hallucinating. Meanwhile, Kyle's dad finally gets an erection and Kyle doesn't have to worry anymore. Randy tells all the angry townspeople that you should only fart in moderation. The townspeople cheer.
Three weeks later, everyone considers Randy a hero again. Stan and Kyle realize they’ve forgotten about Cartman, who is still alive on the cross due to all the excess fat in his body.
Kenny dies when he is the first to spontaneously combust.